Articles
Crasnic, Loriana. 2020. "Resistance in tax transparency standards: Small states' heterogenous responses to new regulations," Review of International Political Economy.

Rocabert, Jofre, Frank Schimmelfennig, Loriana Crasnic and Thomas Winzen. 2018. "The Rise of international parliamentary institutions: Authority and legitimation." Review of International Organizations, 14: 607-631.

Crasnic, Loriana, Nikhil Kalyanpur and Abraham Newman. 2017. "Networked liabilities: Transnational authority in a world of transnational business". European Journal of International Relations 23.4: 906-929.

Books
Schimmelfennig, Frank, Winzen, Thomas, Lenz, Tobias, Rocabert, Jofre, Crasnic, Loriana, Gherasimov, Cristina, Lipps, Jana and Densua Mumford. 2021. The Rise of International Parliamentary Institutions: Authority and Legitimation. Oxford University Press.

Working Projects
Crasnic, Loriana and Lukas Hakelberg. "Power and resistance in the global fight against tax evasion," book chapter in Handbook of the Politics of Taxation (ed. L. Hakelberg and L. Seelkopf). Under contract with Egdar Elgar Publishing.
Abstract: The automatic exchange of information on bank accounts held by non-residents is considered a major breakthrough in the fight against tax evasion. Its multilateral adoption in 2014 obliged tax havens around the world to abolish banking secrecy, providing tax authorities with unprecedented access to data on their taxpayers’ foreign accounts. While analysts usually trace the emergence of this new regime to a credible sanction threat from the United States, they continue to debate the preconditions for this threat, how concessions granted to the United States translated into a multilateral regime, and to what degree targeted jurisdictions retain room for resistance. This chapter reviews these debates, provides a consolidated account of the emergence and current shape of the AEoI regime, and identifies avenues for future research.

Crasnic, Loriana, Schramm, Madison, and Alex Stark. "Global leaders, corruption and gender: Are female leaders penalized more heavily than their male counterparts?", presented at SPSA 2020, Groningen University IPE Colloquium 2020.
Abstract: Are male and female politicians treated differently by their electorates when they engage in illegal use of public positions and if so, why? Some studies suggest that women politicians might benefit from gender stereotypes portraying them as more honest or risk averse, and would thus be accorded more leniency. Others have found that there is either no difference between how male and female politicians are treated, or that women politicians face a gender-related backlash when they contravene stereotypes associated with their group. Most of this research, however, has been based on experimental surveys in high- income nations such as the United States or the United Kingdom. In this research note, we take a broader view and look at actual corruption sentences handed down to world leaders. Using a data set on world leaders spanning the 1945-2015 period, we find that female politicians are substantially more likely to be officially accused of corruption charges, but not more likely to be imprisoned. Evidence from the case studies of Prime Minister Tansu Çiller of Turkey, and president Dilma Rousseff of Brazil suggest that this is due to political elites using corruption charges as a pretext to remove a woman leader from power.

Crasnic, Loriana and Vincent Arel-Bundock. "Two studies on public opinion about international taxation," presented at SPSA 2021.
Abstract: Tax avoidance in general, and corporate tax avoidance more specifically, has been high on the agenda of policymakers in recent years. Initiatives such as the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), which aims to increase tax equity among traditional and digital businesses, have, however, been slow to progress. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable reluctance to change laws and regulations concerning multinational corporations from those countries that profit from the current system. The literature studying these topics has, however, treated these recalcitrant states for the most part as black boxes, limiting insight into why governments pursue certain policies. In the two studies, we take a first step towards rectifying this oversight. In the first study, by means of a public opinion survey conducted in Switzerland, an offshore financial center known for facilitating corporate tax avoidance, we gauge what people’s attitudes towards low tax policies are and whether they change given additional information about the resulting externalities of preferential tax regimes. In the second study, drawing on recent research investigating the idea of "value creation" and more generally scholarship on economic concepts and indicators, by means of another survey experiment also conducted in Switzerland, we inquire about the accuracy of knowledge regarding tax rates and in particular taxes paid by multinational corporations around the globe individuals hold, and whether correcting misapprehensions inclines individuals to change their views regarding global tax equity.  

Crasnic, Loriana and Lukas Hakelberg. "The colonial origins of tax havenry," presented at Otto-Suhr-Institute of Political Science 2021.
Abstract: In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2009, both policymakers and researchers’ attention turned increasingly towards the role of tax havens in international political economy.  Scholars embarked on an agenda of, on the one hand, explaining the origins of this momentous shift in global tax governance and on the other hand, assessing the success of these reforms. An important question, however, that remains insufficiently explored, is how we ended up with a system where a handful of jurisdictions embraced implementing statutory banking secrecy laws, and their attendant negative externalities, as a business model in the first place. In other words, why do countries become tax havens in the first place? The project proposes a two-stage process to answer this question: first, stocks of foreign investment in small jurisdictions governed as British colonies until after World War II were dependent on the existence of an income tax, which itself was a result of profits earned from the plantation economy; second, racist bias from potential investors played a role in the establishment of a tax haven on the global stage. We apply several causal identification strategies, supplemented by qualitative evidence from select tax havens, to test our proposed mechanism.

Crasnic, Loriana and Tabea Palmtag. "International organization death: The role of private actors," presented at ISA Workshop on IO Dissolution 2019.
Abstract: The fact that international organizations (IOs) have been proliferating since the end of World War II is by this point a truism of international relations scholarship. Given increasing interdependence between states, as well as rapid advances in technology, international cooperation became a requisite for solving international problems. But international cooperation does not necessarily have to occur through international organizations and what is less acknowledged is the substantial number of IO deaths that have taken place since the first one was set up in 1815. What does the ecology of international organizations, and in particular their death, tell us about the fabric of international relations? The paper conceptualizes different types of IO death and argues that the increasing prominence of privatization is an important determinant of IO demise. Nonetheless, not all IOs are equally affected by the heightened influence of private market actors.

Crasnic, Loriana. "Resistance and regime reverberations: The Politics and process of international contestation" (book project)
Abstract: Scholars in international relations often times are interested in explaining state adherence to international rules and regulations. At present, the accepted methodology for assessing state action distinguishes between compliance and non-compliance. In the real world, however, states react to international regulations in a variety of ways, questioning the utility of this dichotomy. Even when states initially comply they can continue to act subversively, either at the national or international level. These acts of subversion have the potential to alter both the design as well as the effectiveness of the regime as originally envisioned. As a result, talking about compliance as removed from the substance of regulations and the mechanisms through which they are enforced does not make sense. The book project develops a new concept of resistance in international relations to show the nuanced ways in which state actors react to new international rules and regulations. I distinguish between four styles of resistance politics: submission, foot- dragging, disruption and rejection. Faced with pressure to adhere to new rules, state policymakers will choose one or the other of the four strategies depending on their access to international organizations and their commitment to sectors that would be disadvantaged under the new regulations. The study develops and tests this resistance theory by means of quantitative and qualitative analyses on the pressure offshore financial centers have historically experienced.